Illinois Partnerships and Strategies to Reduce Violent Crime

David M. Kennedy
November 4 & 5, 2015
National Network for Safe Communities

These strategies are carefully designed to

- Reduce **serious violence** and **community chaos**
- Reduce **arrests** and **incarceration**
- Strengthen **disadvantaged communities**
- **Reset relationships** between angry communities and law enforcement
- Operate largely within **existing resources**
GVI Results

A recent Campbell Collaboration Systematic Review of the strategies, and others related to them, concluded that there is now “strong empirical evidence” for their crime prevention effectiveness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative and Location</th>
<th>Reduction in Crime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boston (MA) Operation Ceasefire</td>
<td>63% youth homicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockton (CA) Operation Peacekeeper</td>
<td>42% gun homicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago (IL) Project Safe Neighborhoods</td>
<td>37% homicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell (MA) Project Safe Neighborhoods</td>
<td>44% gun assaults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indianapolis (IN) Violence Reduction Partnership</td>
<td>34% homicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indianapolis (IN) Violence Reduction Partnership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indianapolis (IN) Violence Reduction Partnership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cincinnati (OH) Initiative to Reduce Violence</td>
<td>41% gang member-involved homicide</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Published, peer-reviewed studies with control groups

(Braga & Weisburd 2012)
GVI Results

Published, peer-reviewed studies with control groups

**Boston Operation Ceasefire**
- 36.4% reduction in gang-involved shootings among gangs treated with crackdowns
- 27.4% reduction in gang-involved shootings among gangs that received warnings (Braga 2014)

**Chicago Group Violence Reduction Strategy**
- 32% reduction in victimization among factions represented at call-ins
- 23% reduction in overall shooting behavior among factions represented at call-ins (Papachristos & Kirk 2015)

**NOLA Group Violence Reduction Strategy**
- 32% decrease in group member-involved homicides (Engel & Corsaro 2015)

**Cincinnati CIRV**
- 41.4% reduction in group member-involved homicides, with increasing impact over 3.5 years
- “Focused deterrence approaches can have stability over time if implemented properly and the organizational processes are institutionalized” (Engel, Tillyer, & Corsaro 2013)
Drug market, individual violent offender & probation

Published, peer-reviewed studies with control groups

**High Point DMI**
- 3 out of 4 neighborhoods show a **44% to 56% decrease** in part I UCR crime
- All 4 show a **4%-74% decrease** in drug offenses (Braga & Weisburd 2012)

**Chicago PSN**
- 50% reduction in violent offending among notified parolees (Wallace, et al 2015)
- 37% reduction in homicide and 30% reduction in recidivism rate (Braga & Weisburd 2012)

**Nashville DMI**
- 56% reduction in drug offenses (Braga & Weisburd 2012)

**Rockford DMI**
- 22% reduction in non-violent offenses (Braga & Weisburd 2012)

**Hawaii HOPE**
- 26% reduction in recidivism rate (Hawken 2010)
Violence and community chaos is a national scandal

Violent crime is very high in places, even in “safe” cities
Concentrated in poor minority, especially black, neighborhoods
Black men are ~6% of the population, ~50% of the homicide dead
National homicide rate now ~4:100,000: but in places like Rochester’s “Crescent,” young black men are killed at a rate of 520 in 100,000
- 65 times national average
- 1 in 200 young black men killed every year
THE NATURE OF STREET GROUPS
Connection between violence & groups

The most important finding here is simple: there is a profound and so far invariant connection between serious violence, and highly active criminal groups.
Street group members face extremely high risk

national homicide: 4 in 100,000

homicides for core group-involved network: 1,500-3,000 in 100,000

for those close to victims of homicide and shooting, the risk increases by up to 900%
Baltimore 2013

Total population: 40,900

Group Member Involved (GMI): Between 528 - 538

Groups: 31

Source: Western District-Baltimore Group Violence Intervention Problem Analysis
Chattanooga 2013

Total population: 171,279

Group Member Involved (GMI): between 653 and 863

Groups: 39

Source: Chattanooga Group Violence Intervention Problem Analysis
Very different setting:
More active, historically embedded gang culture
Different, but essentially parallel dynamics

In one police district with a singularly intergenerational Hispanic gang scene...
Criminal histories of Newark Murder Victims and Suspects, 2012-2013

Mean Prior Offenses

- Total Prior Offenses: 9.9 (Victims, N=162), 8.3 (Offenders, N=98)
- Violent Offenses: 1.6 (Victims, N=162), 1.4 (Offenders, N=98)
- Property Offenses: 1.2 (Victims, N=162), 1.6 (Offenders, N=98)
- Drug Offenses: 5.2 (Victims, N=162), 3.6 (Offenders, N=98)
- Non-Violent Weapon Offenses: 0.6 (Victims, N=162), 0.8 (Offenders, N=98)
- Disorder Offenses: 1 (Victims, N=162), 0.4 (Offenders, N=98)
- Other Offenses: 0.5 (Victims, N=162), 0.6 (Offenders, N=98)
## Characteristics of Street Group Members (Updated March 2008, n=748)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>1 or more</th>
<th>5 or more</th>
<th>10 or more</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Misdemeanor arrest charges</td>
<td>14.40%</td>
<td>89.7%</td>
<td>72.3%</td>
<td>56.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Misdemeanor charge convictions</td>
<td>10.13</td>
<td>86.2%</td>
<td>66.0%</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Felony arrest charges</td>
<td>7.43</td>
<td>84.4%</td>
<td>59.4%</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Felony charge convictions</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>74.5%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Delinquent arrest charges</td>
<td>12.73</td>
<td>81.5%</td>
<td>68.3%</td>
<td>52.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Delinquent charge adjudications</td>
<td>8.51</td>
<td>80.3%</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Approach w/ caution (0=no, 1=yes)</td>
<td></td>
<td>71%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Violent arrest (0=no, 1=yes)</td>
<td></td>
<td>91%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Drug arrest (0=no, 1=yes)</td>
<td></td>
<td>91%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cincinnati Policing Institute
CIRV network analysis of sets

Source: University of Cincinnati Policing Institute

"Beef"  Alliance  Volatile
Why groups matter

Group dynamics drive the action

- Peer pressure and “pluralistic ignorance”
- Vendettas, boy-girl issues, respect
Why *groups* matter

Street code – not money – drives the action. Typically less than 20% of homicides are about money, drug business, etc.
Why *groups* matter

The groups carry the street code:

- Disrespect requires violence
- We’re street soldiers and the community approves of what we’re doing
- We’re not afraid of death or prison
- The enemy of my friend is my enemy
- The cops are against us: it’s personal

*Even most “business” killings are really about disrespect*
Mass incarceration damages families and communities

- Nearly 3 million children have a parent in prison
- One in nine black children has a parent in prison
- 4% of children without incarcerated fathers get expelled from school
- About 25% with incarcerated fathers get expelled
- Half (49%) of all black men have been arrested by the time they’re 23
- One in eight black men can’t vote
- Permanent impact on school, marriage, employment, earnings
- Concentrated in poor black neighborhoods
These communities need **law enforcement**

But they need a different kind of law enforcement than they’ve been getting.
STRATEGIC INTERVENTION
Framework

Direct, sustained engagement with core offenders by a partnership standing and acting together:

- Community leaders
- Social service providers
- Law enforcement

Explicit focus on homicide and serious violence

Core elements:

- Moral engagement
- Offer of help
- Swift, certain, legitimate consequences

An approach, not a program
Focused law enforcement

Group accountability for group violence by any legal means:
“Pulling levers”

Specifying Enforcement Trigger
“First group/worst group” promise
First homicide after call-in
Most violent group
After each call-in, if no group wants to be first or worst, everybody stops

Formal notice of legal exposure
Formal notice of law enforcement intent
Deterrence not enforcement

We want **compliance**, not arrests and sentences.
Actual enforcement is (mostly) a sign of failure.
When something drastic is about to happen, it’s in everyone’s interest to avoid it.
**Goal**: make consequences so clear and certain that nobody wants them.

Keep offenders and communities **safe**.

Provide “**honorable exit**”.
Evaluation showed a 26.7% reduction in shootings for violent groups put on notice by law enforcement.

“Worst group”

New Orleans: Multi-Agency Gang (MAG) Unit

- Federal sanctions are extremely meaningful, even to the most hardened offenders
- Federal group-focused operations are rare and slow
- New approaches can produce federal operations quickly and, in principle, frequently
- MAG Unit turning out case ~8 weeks
- Perfect fit with group violence strategy

Fundamentally alters law enforcement dynamics with street groups
“Next group”

Philadelphia Street Level Enforcement

- Relentless focus on group: “death by a thousand cuts”
- Nearly all enforcement is state and local
  - Warrants, drug enforcement, license and registration checks, open case reviews, cold case reviews, selected federal adoption, probation, parole, animal control, utilities, cable
- Despite street bravado, groups absolutely do care about state and local enforcement when it’s done right
- Long history of effective state and local group-focused intervention
  - Entire “Operation Ceasefire” strategy drawn from creative street policing

Creative, sustained local action is powerful, reestablishes the effectiveness of state and local law enforcement, and reduces reliance on federal authorities and extreme sanctions
Moral engagement with offenders

Offenders can and will choose, should be treated as responsible human beings

Challenge the street code

There’s right, there’s wrong: no gray area

Activates agency: offender is now in control

Treats offender with respect: procedural justice

Enhances law enforcement legitimacy

Mobilizes community partners
Community moral voice

Clear, direct community stand from respected local figures, parents, ministers, mothers, activists:

“We need you alive and out of prison.”

“You’re better than this.”

“We hate the violence.”

Offenders and ex-offenders:

“Who helped your mother last time you were locked up?”

“How long before one of your boys sleeps with your girlfriend?”

“Who thinks it’s okay for little kids to get killed?”

Outreach workers are among the very best at all of this.
Street outreach workers

- Have more respect on the street than just about anybody else
- Have unquestionable authenticity
- Can reach the core group population
- Can say things that nobody else can say
- Can help replace the toxic street code with something alternative and affirmative
- Can work closely with other partners to broker help, convey law enforcement warnings, defuse disputes, control rumors, help save face
Detached streetwork

- Long history of mixed and negative evaluations
- Can increase violence through strengthening gang cohesion
- In modern times, no published peer-reviewed studies of core model
- Mixed results in body of evaluations: positive, neutral, negative
- Concerns about undercutting legitimacy
- No city-level results at all
Community norms and narratives

Real and awful history of racism in America
Real illegality and abuse
Unpopularity of even legal police actions

Community narrative:
Police actions are conspiracy and deliberate oppression, the latest in a long history of same
Disrespectful treatment alienates communities and undercuts legitimacy

“Lamont explained:

‘[The police] they crooked. I mean they try to do anything [to you]. I ain’t tryin’ to be prejudice[d] but I think the police don’t like black people. You know like all the crooked cops always be in theghettos, where all the black people at and they try to get as many black people off the street as they can.’

Most respondents shared Lamont’s view that the urban policing mission disproportionally focuses on poor blacks.”

Rod Brunson, “Police Don’t Like Black People: African-American Young Men’s Accumulated Police Experiences”
In New York City

Young black people in troubled neighborhoods report:

- 44% had been stopped nine or more times
- Less than a third were ever told why they were stopped
- 71% had been frisked
- 64% had been searched
- 45% had been threatened
- 46% had had force used against them
- 25% had weapons displayed against them

Source: Vera Institute of Justice
The result

- 88% of young people say people in their neighborhood don’t trust the police
- Only 40% would ask the police for help
- Only 25% would report someone who had committed a crime

Source: Vera Institute of Justice
Law enforcement norms and narratives

Community anger, suspicion, and silence misunderstood by law enforcement as tolerance for crime and violence

Law enforcement narrative:
The community has lost its moral center
Nobody cares
Everybody is living off drug money
“[People in the Eastern District are] drugged- out, lazy motherfuckers. These people don’t want to work. They want to sit on their ass, collect welfare, get drunk, and make babies. Let them shoot each other.”

Baltimore police officer, quoted in Peter Moskos, *Cop in the Hood*.
Addressing norms and narratives

In order for law enforcement and community truly to work together, they must address mutual and toxic misunderstandings

Law enforcement is not solving the problem, is doing harm, is playing into terrible stereotypes
Community is not taking responsibility, is not setting standards, is playing into terrible stereotypes
I understand the historical divide between police and communities of color – it’s rooted in the history of this country. The most visible arm of government is a police force, and the institutionalized governmental programs that promoted racist policies that were enforced by police departments in this country are part of the African American history in this country. And we have to recognize it because recognition is the first step toward finding a cure for what is ailing us.

Over the years we’ve actually done a lot of things wrong and I’m willing to admit that. A lot of police executives are defensive. We’ve done a lot wrong.

Garry McCarthy, Superintendent, Chicago Police Department
What is **police legitimacy**?

The belief that authorities have the right to dictate proper behavior
The standing of authorities in the eyes of the community
Driven by perceptions of fairness, equity, and respect
Directly linked to increased or reduced levels of violence

“Stop snitching”
Call the cops or pick up a gun?
GVI treats offenders respectfully, as responsible human beings

Getting **legitimacy** right may be **the single**
most important thing we can do
GVI allows law enforcement to say to the community

- We know hardly anybody in the community is dangerous
- We know most group members don’t like the violence
- We’re going to do everything we can to keep them alive and out of prison
- We think they’ll listen to you
- We’re going to offer them help
- We’re going to tell them exactly how law enforcement will be operating
- Only then, if they kill somebody, are we coming in heavy
Help as a moral and practical obligation

“We are here to keep you alive and out of prison.”
“You have been targeted – to be saved.”
Address trauma
Protect from enemies
Offer “big small stuff” – crucial real-time needs
Safe havens
New relationships and “sponsors”
New ideas to replace “street code”
Links to traditional social services – education, work, etc.
Street outreach an important way to do all this
Support & Outreach

A broad outline

Past programs have sought to provide

- Education and remedial education
- Life skills
- Job training and placement
- Substance abuse and mental health treatment
- Mentoring
- Emergency assistance
- Reentry-type services
Support & outreach

Perceptual differences

GVI model
- Deals with small population of active group members
- Success is keeping people alive and reducing violence

Traditional services
- Community-wide orientation
- Success is program completion, job placement & retention, recidivism, etc.
Support & outreach

The Big Small Stuff

- Supplement traditional social services with the things nobody will pay for
- Fill in where social service programs can’t reach
- More realistically, immediately, and fluidly address participant needs
A new framework

- Doors are always open: build relationships, create a new and positive community, meet often
- Replace the street, build new idea of life
- Honor and address trauma
- Protect from harm
- Be able to respond to immediate needs
- Outperform the street: be available 24/7, advocate
- Incentivize collaboration, acknowledge achievement
- Help people articulate what they feel and need: “A closed mouth doesn’t get fed”
- Special attention to failing participants
The Call-in

The Call-in is direct communication with group members on probation or parole as a way of delivering the GVI message to all groups in a city at once. *It is not (mostly) about the people in the room.*

Identify groups, identify probationers and parolees, deliver notices to appear, rehearse and hold call-in.
Custom notifications

A method for communities, law enforcement and service providers to talk directly to street group members, letting them know that they are important and valued members of the community, that the GVI partners want to keep them alive and out of prison, that support & outreach are available, and giving them individualized information about their legal risk.
Community Police Response to Victims of Violence

**CPRVV** is a community-led team in Chattanooga that responds to every shooting and homicide. Makes contact with victims and families.

Delivers message:
- We’re here to ensure that you’re safe from harm.
- Law enforcement is prioritizing this investigation and there will be no retaliation.
- Help is available through victims services office.

Has increased community cooperation in investigations.
Positive word of mouth in community about CPRVV responses.
Applications

Group Violence Intervention
Drug Market Intervention
Chicago PSN
Individual violent offenders
Swift, Certain & Fair
Domestic Violence Intervention
Prison Violence Intervention
Robbery – NYPD “JRIP”
Larceny Intervention
24/7
Prosecution notifications
Various one offs:
   No Mas
   “costumed notifications”
The basic approach: individual violent offenders

Chicago PSN

Parole call-ins after release from prison
- Notice of exposure to federal gun laws
- Ex-offender statement
- Offer of services

50% reduction in violent offending relative to controls
The basic approach: shut down overt drug markets

Drug Market Intervention

Break connection between dealers and buyers in overt drug markets

- Investigate all street-level dealers
- Prosecute violent offenders
- Create certainty for non-violent offenders by “banking” cases

Permanent elimination of market
The basic approach: fundamental probation reform

“Swift, certain, and fair”

Replace rare and unpredictable major sanctions with swift and certain minor sanctions

Dramatic increases in compliance, lower rates of jail, prison, and new offenses